Abstract: According to "Western" models, there are three different stages of electioneering. In Indonesia, elements of these different stages are now combined. The result is not a comprehensive "Americanization", but a professionalization, along with a hybridization of indigenous and foreign methods. At the beginning, the elections of 1955 were marked by a localized campaign and the absence of TV, pollsters and consultants. The long suppression of electoral politics (from 1957 until 1998) has decelerated the transition toward new forms of electioneering. Technological change, institutional reforms (especially the introduction of direct presidential and direct local elections), the general dealignment of political parties, and the extraordinary rise of pollsters and consultants have effected a professionalization and commercialization of campaigning since the fall of Suharto. Political parties are now tending to become more market-oriented.
Introduction
After the authoritarian New Order (1965/66-98) under President Suharto had crumbled, Indonesia witnessed a rapid transition toward a form of electoral democracy. Indonesia's political system is now characterized by free and fair elections and a set of considerably well-functioning central political institutions, but also by substantial governance weaknesses. Whereas literature on Indonesia's political parties, parliament, decentralization and human rights situation abounds, scholarly work on campaigning in Indonesia is scarce. This is surprising, given the enormous changes that took place over the last decade, especially if one looks at the astonishing amount of scientific production on consultants, "spin doctors", "war rooms", political marketing, etc., in Europe and the US.
This article 1 presents some of the main actors and methods in Indonesia. It analyses the evolution of campaigning, especially after 1998, and its connection to party change. The transformation of campaigning is described as both "professionalization" and "commercialization". "Professionalism" denotes the involvement of pollsters and other specialists who use scientific means. 2 Professionalization encompasses different processes:
Elected representatives learn how to deal in a more skilled way with the media; political consultants build up expertise which they can apply in different circumstances and in different conditions; pollsters, too, apply basic skills in different environments (Negrine and Lilleker 2002: 312) .
"Commercialization" is linked to professionalization because new techniques necessitate huge investments and thus modify the diverse relations between business and politics. The legacies of Indonesia's authoritarianism, the defects of its young, electoral democracy and the general dealignment 3 of political parties amplify the strong impact of "money politics". Technological change, institutional reforms (especially the introduction of direct presidential and direct local elections), and the extraordinary rise of pollsters and consultants have effected spiralling costs and a commercialization of campaigning.
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Dealignment, that is, the loosened attachment to political parties, is manifested by decreasing membership figures, a weakening party identification, and growing numbers of swing voters.
Professionalization and commercialization together have a major impact on political parties. Whereas Western European democracies and their political parties have gradually adapted to technological change and have sustained their role as principal campaign machines, newer democracies are, by contrast, products of the television age, where the buzzwords are vote maximization and campaign professionalism. Parties and political elites in these countries were not shackled to old structures (Farrell, Kolodny, and Medvic 2001: 24) .
The article is organized as follows: First, the paper distinguishes three stages of campaigning with reference to typical developments in Western countries. This standard model serves as a general heuristic device. Then, the paper depicts the evolution of electioneering in Indonesia since the 1955 elections. The substantially new form of campaigning that started after the fall of Suharto with mass media, pollsters and professional consultants will be characterized as professionalization and commercialization. The possible effects of this process on political parties will be discussed at the end.
This article does not give a comprehensive depiction of all electoral methods, but focuses on pollsters and consultants, whereas more traditional campaigning techniques and the role of new media (TV and the Internet, e.g. social-networking sites) are dealt with only in passing. Farrell and Webb (2000) , Norris (2000) , Plasser and Plasser (2002) , Gibson and Römmele (2009) and others differentiate between three stages of campaigning in Western countries (see Table 1 ). At the beginning, electioneering was characterized by face-to-face communication among party members and voters; posters; banners; leaflets; mass events; and rallies. The short-term, low-budget campaign was led by the party leadership, but party volunteers were dispersed in local areas and loosely organized. Feedback was channelled via direct links between party activists and the electorate that was based in solid social milieus. Consultants were not important, in contrast to canvassers and other party activists, and the partisan press was a major source of information. Radio and movies contributed to the nationalization of the campaign.
Stages of Campaigning and Party Development
In the second phase, mass media -especially television -played a decisive role. Sources of feedback were large-scale opinion polls. Specialist consultants responsible, for instance, for impression management and the production of "sound bites" were growing in prominence. The nationally coordinated, strategic campaign was organized by the central party apparatus with party-based, salaried professionals. TV debates, press conferences and "pseudo-events" were the crux of campaigning. At the same time, charismatic personalities and the central party apparatus in general became focal points for voter mobilization.
In stage three of election campaigning -beginning in the late 1980s/ early 1990s and also referred to as postmodern, post-Fordist or "Americanstyle" electioneering -parties use new communication technologies such as the Internet and public relations consultants who base their findings on more sophisticated opinion polls and focus group interviews. Schmitt-Beck (2007: 746) stresses the growing importance of strategic thinking, the influx of technical expertise, and an approach centred on persuasion rather than mobilization of voters. Especially in the US, campaigning is much more targeted and business-like. Consultants are quite independent from the traditional party leadership. There are various media outlets, owing to satellite and cable stations, talk radio, and 24-hour rolling news bulletins. The Internet provides opportunities for new forms of voter-candidate interaction. 4 Routine decision-making within political parties is also informed by polls and focus group interviews. 5 The multidimensional index to measure parties' use of professionalized campaign techniques during elections by Gibson and Römmele (2009: 270ff.) The stages are sometimes linked to different strategies by political parties that are, according to Lees-Marshment (2001) , ideal-typically either product-, sales-, or market-oriented. Using this approach, she directly transfers marketing concepts to the analysis of political parties. Thus, a product-oriented party argues for its own ideas and policies and does not change its ideas or product even if it fails to succeed at elections. A sales-oriented party believes generally in its own ideas and policies, but realizes that these have to be "sold" to the public. It retains the product design, but tries to persuade voters. 6 A market-oriented party intends to identify the needs and wants of selected groups and responds by adjusting its policies, images and behaviour. Thus, these market-oriented parties design their behaviour to provide voter satisfaction, and their programmatical commitments are highly flexible. The downside of such an approach is that voters are no longer able to identify a party with a specific political content. It has to be added that political marketing and the professionalization of political campaigning are two separate concepts, and a political party that decides to follow a sales-oriented campaign rather than a market-oriented campaign is not necessarily less professionalized (Strömbäck 2007) . Kindred with this approach is the usual conceptualization of party evolution, especially in Europe. According to this model, catch-all parties (Kirchheimer 1966) trying to mobilize voters across all social groups substituted the mass-integration or mass-class parties of stage one -that is, parties like the archetypical social democrats in different European countries with their affiliated mass organizations, their rootedness in social milieus, and their strong imprint on lifestyles and worldviews. The ties between citizens and parties are weaker in the second stage, and party activists at the grass roots lose their impact. Also characteristic of the second stage are a drastic reduction in the party's ideological baggage; the strengthening of top leadership groups; a downgrading of the role of the individual party member; the de-emphasis of the specific social class or denominational clientele; and the objective of securing access to a variety of interest groups. Finally, so-called "electoral-professional" (Panebianco 1988) or professionalized media communication parties (Jun 2004 ) are said to be the typical organizational outgrowth of the third stage of electioneering. Ideal type electoral-professional parties are dominated by professional politicians who work together with media, marketers and advertising specialists. The leadership is personalized, the party is linked directly to voters, and the membership is small. The par-
6
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ties are funded by various interest groups and are not oriented toward specific ideologies, but rather stress certain marketable issues. This model has been developed in Western countries and is only applicable with certain caveats in mind. Even in OECD countries, the trajectories of electioneering are more complex than the model may suggest. The three stages are not exclusive from one another; that is, techniques of any one stage are not simply replaced by the next. In addition, localized and interactive forms of campaigning that are supposedly more typical for stage one have been re-animated recently (Geisler and Gerster 2007) . Moreover, some authors term the three stages "traditional", "modern" and "postmodern" campaigning (Norris 2000) , but it would be misleading to interpret the model in such a teleological way. 7 The three stages are ideal types in the Weberian sense and, thus, merely a heuristic device. It allows for a comparison to be made with OECD countries and offers a theoretical basis on which to evaluate developments in countries such as Indonesia, which use some Western technological and organizational innovations.
Campaigning in Indonesia before 1998
The Elections in 1955
After independence, the new elites introduced a democracy with a semipresidential system of government. Party politics during the first parliamentary democracy have to be seen against the background of aliran, or, socio-political "streams". The four most important parties with their affiliated women's, youth, religious, professional, and labour organizations politicized these streams (Feith 1957: 31ff.; Feith 1962: 125ff.; Lev 1967) . The NU (Nahdatul Ulama -Renaissance of Islamic Scholars), a so-called "traditionalist" Muslim party, represented mostly Javanese ulama (religious scholars) and their rural followers. NU members belonged to the group of orthodox Muslims, or santri. This was also true of the "modernist" Muslim Masyumi that counted among its followers urban intellectuals, traders, and artisans and was particularly successful on the Outer Islands beyond Java. Non-orthodox or syncretist (abangan) parties were the nationalist PNI (Partai Nasionalis Indonesia -Indonesian Nationalist Party), strong among state employees and civil servants and their clients, and the PKI (Partai Komunis   7 Campaigning by social democrats, communists, and fascists in Germany in the 1920s, for instance, was not "traditional". Besides, the differentiation between "modern" and "postmodern" is highly questionable.
Indonesia -Indonesian Communist Party), a well-organized party with followers among abangan workers and peasants in urban and rural areas. Parties in the 1950s were rooted in social milieus and mobilized voters along social cleavages: abangan versus santri, traditionalist Islam versus modernist Islam, urban versus rural, Java versus Outer Islands, capital versus labour. Accordingly, the campaigns for the 1955 national elections were mainly cleavage-based. Advertisement agencies, consultants and opinion polling were all absent. TV and radio were not widely used; even newspapers had only a combined circulation of less than 1 million (Feith 1957: 24) . Henceforth, mass rallies and face-to-face communication were the major channels to popularize parties and their platforms. The goal of campaigning was not to sell or market concepts, but rather to broaden the knowledge about a particular party and its goals. Farrell and Webb (2000) contend that a decentralized campaign organization with strong local branches is one of the main features of stage one. This is corroborated in the case of Indonesia, where village-level organizations were of tremendous importance. Feith (1957: 26) states that the parties without an extensive network of village-level organization, that hoped instead to contact the villager through mass media, were not successful. Even "considerable financial resources and the advantages of occupancy of government power" were insufficient and "effective electioneering methods in Indonesia are those effected at the village level; there are no shortcuts".
In order to undertake effective electioneering, parties need high membership figures and an efficient apparatus. Parties were weakly organized until 1953 -with the communist PKI and the Islamic Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia -Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims) as partial exceptions -but the election campaign itself transformed parties and voters alike (Rocamora 1975: 126ff.) . Parties developed more advanced organizational forms. The elections "produced a shift in the village status balance", created new "collectivist entities" and in a number of village areas "party branches acquired the characteristics of living communities" (Feith 1957: 36) .
Elections under Authoritarianism
In line with President Sukarno's call to "bury the parties", their role was effectively downgraded during the Guided Democracy period . Electoral politics were somewhat revived under the military-dominated New Order regime (1965/66-98 ), yet polls functioned mostly as a "useful fiction" (Liddle 1996) constructed to provide legitimacy and to channel dissatisfaction into a highly orchestrated and ritualized pseudo-competition.
The regime party Golkar (Golongan Karya -Functional Groups), a federation of organizations representing peasants, workers, youth, students, women, fishermen, civil servants, intellectuals, veterans, the armed forces, etc., have won all six elections since 1971, each time with more than 60 per cent of the votes. As a result of a so-called "simplification" of the party system in 1973, five Christian and/or nationalist parties (among them, the PNI) and four Islamic parties were forced to fuse, respectively, into the secular-oriented PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia -Indonesian Democratic Party) and the Islamic PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembanguan -United Development Party).
Political party activity was highly restricted. The campaign period was brief, and in between elections the PDI and the PPP were forced to reduce their activities, whereas government officials, generally loyal to Golkar, used the administrative machinery during the whole legislative period. Against the background of the "floating mass" (massa mengambang) doctrine, according to which the bulk of the population was politically uneducated and susceptible to manipulation, the PDI and the PPP were not allowed to establish branches below the district level. Parties were expected to be "programmeoriented": They should be identified by the programme they offered for the development of the country, and not by a distinctive ideology or denomination. It should be their concrete proposals that attracted voters and not the fact that they represented a particular mainstream of society (van Dijk 1992: 54) .
This ideology of depoliticization that is so typical for authoritarian regimes prevented a comprehensive mobilization of the populace. The, at best, semioppositional PDI and PPP were not able to offer truly alternative political ideas. Elections were rigged by vote-buying (for example, the serangan fajar, or, "dawn attacks" before election day); intimidation; manipulation of the vote count; the screening of prospective candidates by the government; the removal of maverick politicians; and all kinds of campaign restrictions.
Campaigning was mostly confined to techniques and means typical for stage one (mass rallies, banners, posters, leaflets, etc.), but often with a distinct Indonesian flavour: motorized, noisy parades of party supporters (pawai) or the so-called national "safari" tours (with hundreds of singers, comedians, dancers and musicians) that were invented by Golkar in 1971. Lindsay (2007: 64) and others stress the ritualized character of elections that were known in Indonesia as pesta demokrasi ("democracy party" or "democracy festival"), a term comprising meanings of ceremonial performance, entertainment andat times -ecstatic transgression.
Due to financial, logistical and, above all, political restrictions, electioneering remained at stage one. Television and new media played only a very limited role, surveys were not used, and campaigning was organized by the party staff and not by external experts. The state-owned television served Golkar's interests. The Internet and satellite TV gained influence ahead of the 1997 elections; although the new media contributed to the delegitimation of the New Order and the elections, their impact on campaigning remained marginal (Schiller 1999: 7f.) .
Campaigning after the Fall of Suharto: New Media, Pollsters, and Consultants
TV and the Internet
After the fall of Suharto in May 1998, the Indonesian polity was profoundly democratized within a short time. During the transition period up to the June 1999 elections, the new government implemented radical reforms in political party and electoral laws. It also guaranteed basic political rights and civil liberties and loosened the shackles of New Order media restrictions. In fact, over 1,200 new printing licences and more than 900 new commercial radio licences were issued. By 2002, five new TV stations had come into being: Metro TV, Trans TV, Global TV, TV 7 and Lativi. Today, television is the most important medium for effective campaigning and very few voters are contacted directly by parties, village officials, or religious leaders (Mujani and Liddle 2010: 42) . 8 On TV, talk shows, duels between presidential candidates 9 and advertising in particular are the main venues for political parties and candidates to disseminate information and to heighten their popularity. This also holds true for many local elections. Hill (2009: 250) , for instance, who examined pilkada (local direct elections) in Surabaya, North Sulawesi, Manado, and Kutai, found a decline in the importance of direct communication of voters with the campaign team, and a rise in television's influence. 8 Although, in 2004, some parties such as the PKS and the Christian PDS (Partai Damai Sejahtera, Peace and Prosperity Party) recognized the advantages of doorto-door canvassing (NDI 2004: 10f.) . 9
In June and July 2009, a range of debates between presidential and vice-presidential candidates, respectively, were aired on Indonesian TV. Since the topics for these two-hour debates were agreed on in advance and the form of discussion was highly regulated, the events were rather uninspiring to most in the audience.
The impact of "traditional" campaigning techniques -the distribution of leaflets, the use of billboards and posters, mass rallies, pawai, etc. -is not as important as in the 1950s (Lindsay 2007) . Like under the New Order regime, the attendance at mass rallies is usually remunerated with basic commodities, T-shirts, or small amounts of money. 10 Early studies suggest that so far the Internet has not had a decisive effect on campaigning because of the low Internet penetration. Hill (2003: 526) states that in 1999, it was an effective and particularly significant means of scrutinizing the fledgling democratic processes, but it "was not a tool for party propaganda". And Hameed (2007) , in her analysis of the 2004 elections, arrives at the conclusion that "the Web was poorly used, if at all, as a campaign medium. The sites that did exist were often poorly designed and maintained, and there seemed to be little expectation that the internet would be used to gain much political information" (Hameed 2007: 206) . During the presidential elections, many of the sites were outdated. Websites have not been seen as places that "could transform the political process itself by inviting greater citizen involvement in the process" (Hameed 2007: 206) . Although the Internet was a useful resource for political information and networking among political activists, and although many politicians have their own facebook accounts and the homepages of political parties are increasingly professionalized, the Internet was still of secondary importance for campaigning in the 2009 elections and the pilkada.
With the recent prominence of TV-based campaigning, personality features have begun to loom large (Aspinall 2005: 143) . Celebrities are increasingly portrayed as political performers -not just as attractions at mass rallies -and the presidential and vice-presidential candidates presented themselves as performers, singing pop songs at mass rallies as well as on TV (Lindsay 2007: 66f.) . Although the "celebrity factor" is becoming more and more pronounced, especially below the national level, other features of campaigning are more salient (Kompas 2010b ).
Electoral Reform
One of the reasons for the rise of pollsters and consultants is electoral reforms (Ufen 2010 ). Indonesia has a presidential system with a bicameral parliament. The First Chamber, the House of Representatives (DPR), has 560 members who are selected in 77 multi-member constituencies with 3-10 seats. 11 Since 2004 the president and vice president have been elected directly, and as of 2005, direct elections include mayors, district chiefs and governors. Parties had to identify the most popular candidate in a province, district or municipality; would-be candidates had to conduct surveys to check their own popularity ratings. An internal guideline of Golkar in 2005, for instance, demanded local branches present a list of potential candidates to the central executive. On the basis of surveys, the popularity of the candidates would be decisive. The popularity ratings have accelerated the rise of candidates that are often not members of the party that nominates them. The pilkada since 2005 have thus established pollsters as "makers and breakers of political campaigns" (Mietzner 2009: 107) .
Moreover, after a 2008 decision by the constitutional court, only candidates who have won the plurality of votes in their respective constituencies can become members of parliament. All these measures have entailed a presidentialization of political parties, a personalization of politics and -to a certain degree -a strengthening of local political elites. The transition from a party-centred system to a candidate-centred system led to a personalization of campaigning.
Pollsters and Advertising Agencies
The most important innovations since the fall of Suharto are polling and the professional consultancy of candidates and parties. Between 1999 and 2004, few political parties employed pollsters on a regular basis. Afterwards, when pollsters and political consultants proliferated, Mietzner (2009: 101) observed a "breakthrough of opinion polling as a major element of political interaction". Before, politicians had regularly dismissed surveys as flawed as well as unrealistic, and they expected voters to follow party guidelines and support candidates nominated by the central executive. But Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's victory in the 2004 presidential elections and the accurate surveys by pollsters accompanying it convinced leading politicians that campaigns had to be organized differently in the future.
The first pollsters emerged in the late 1990s. Likewise, the diffusion of US campaign and marketing techniques is not a linear process resulting in a uniform standardization of international campaign practices. Plasser (2000: 35) sees this as the adoption of a "shopping" model where down-to-earth techniques are implemented in a national context without altering country-and culture-specific campaign styles and philosophies. The convergence is the outgrowth of common technological, economic and political changes.
The pollsters and consultants today are overwhelmingly Indonesians. They have transformed party politics and electioneering in just a few years' time, and they were the predecessors of the political consultants that came into existence only recently.
The first political marketing agency that engineered whole campaigns and actively created new images was the Lingkaran Survei Indonesia headed by Denny J.A., who had previously worked for the Lembaga Survei Indone-sia. 14 The Lingkaran Survei Indonesia, established in November 2004, was also the first pollster that signed a contract with a political party, Golkar. It was asked to conduct surveys in nine provinces and 100 districts. It even detects popular would-be candidates and offers them the whole package of financing by investors and campaigning. 15 One must bear in mind that raising funds on behalf of the candidates is problematic. The Lingkaran Survei Indonesia, for example, sometimes finances the campaign of a candidate in advance, with the understanding that he or she has to pay back double that amount if he or she is elected. Since the newly elected candidate does not have the money to finance his own campaign, he has to use his new position to pay back his debts. 16 The other big player in the consultancy sector besides the Lingkaran Survei Indonesia is Fox Indonesia. It was established in February 2008 by Choel and Rizal Mallarangeng. It works for only three parties, the PD (Partai Demokrat -Democrat Party), the PAN and Golkar, in order to not lose credibility. Fox Indonesia defines itself as a company that provides "strategic and political consulting". According to Choel Mallarangeng, 17 it provides numerous services: style and content analysis, social and political networking, media campaigning, media monitoring, surveys in cooperation with the Lembaga Survei Indonesia, event organizing, simulation of public debates, etc. During the presidential campaign of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Fox Indonesia was responsible for image-making, countering negative campaigning (such as the "neoliberalism" accusation by Megawati Sukarnoputri and Prabowo), 18 arranging advertising, and organizing events. Susilo had a range of campaign teams aside from Fox Indonesia and the staff of the Partai Demokrat. These military-style teams (Echo, Romeo, Foxtrot, etc.) The latest development in the field is the establishment of PolMark in October 2009, a consultancy that expressly states that it wants to contribute to improving the democratic system by offering more than other consultancies can. It also targets government agencies, parliaments, and state-owned enterprises. With its PolMark Research Center (PRC) it intends to provide a range of "revolutionary" new data in cooperation with Mars Indonesia and Masima Cipta Karya. 21 19 Consulting candidates for the DPR and DPD is not yet lucrative for the agencies. 20 Interview with Arya Fernandes, Charta Politika, Jakarta, 10 June 2010. 21 The PolMark head, Eep Saefulloh Fatah, has a track record predestinating him for consultancy. For a long time he has been a lecturer at the prestigious Universitas Indonesia, and he worked for many years as a columnist and on TV. He is married to a well-known TV presenter and gains, to a certain extent, from her celebrity status. He was a member of the MPR for a short time, then he was assigned to be a member of Team 11, which was charged with screening the political parties ahead of the 1999 national elections, among other tasks. He is, thus, well connected to journalists, scientists, and politicians alike.
Campaign consultancy is a thriving business in Indonesia because more than 500 local elections in four years' time are scheduled. In each of these elections, at least two candidates take part. In 2010 alone, more than 200 pilkada were conducted. Local candidates often use their own staff, but they have increasingly been engaging external experts. In Indonesia, these consultancies usually do not work exclusively for one party; yet, Fox Indonesia, for instance, has a close relationship with Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and his Partai Demokrat, and with Aburizal Bakrie (Golkar). Charta Politika is to a certain extent connected with the PAN. To outside observers, it is problematic that the distinction between private and public surveys is often unclear and that pollsters often do not disclose their sponsors (Qodari 2010: 130) . In 2009, the Lembaga Survei Indonesia publicly confessed that it was paid by the consultancy Fox Indonesia for the surveys it published ahead of the elections (see Jakarta Post 2009a). According to other pollsters, this financial dependence results in doctored survey results. Yet, these accusations are often hardly verifiable, and the Lembaga Survei Indonesia, especially, enjoys a good reputation. Yet, in another spectacular case, Johan Silalahi, the director of LRI and a political consultant to the campaign of Jusuf Kalla, closed down his agency after publishing a seriously flawed survey (see Jakarta Post 2009b). Some pollsters are said to have manipulated surveys in order to get more lucrative orders from customers (see Kompas 2009 ). Many of these widely circulating accusations are not verifiable, but for many observers at least plausible.
The consultants have wide-ranging contacts to the media and the political parties. They tend to offer a whole package of services, in contrast to their counterparts in the US and Europe who often focus on specific techniques. Leading consultants are well-known and media-savvy personalities. Most of them have studied political science, often in Australia or the US. They did not systematically study political marketing overseas, but have developed their own styles. Remarkably, the marketing logic extends also to elections within parties and within, for example, the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KADIN), Different candidates for the position of chairman commissioned agencies with impression management and voter mobilization ahead of the elections in September 2010.
The whole market is still in its infancy and political parties generally lag behind in grasping the importance of a professionalized form of political communication. Yet, political parties are increasingly forced to seek external advice. That leads to tensions within parties between the central or local executive and the hired professionals around the candidates because the company tends to take over the planning and conducting of the campaign at all stages (Jakarta Globe 2009a). These tensions are typical for stage-three campaigning (Schafferer 2006: 130) .
With regard to the "three-stages model" presented above, one could say that campaigns in Indonesia today are marked by a country-specific mixture of techniques, but that, generally speaking, Indonesia is somewhere between stage two and three. Campaigning is still TV-centred, whereas the concept of narrow-casting through multiple channels -telemarketing, e-mail, direct mail, etc. -is still uncommon. But nationally well-known consultants are competing with the ordinary party executive over the conduct of the campaign. Parties are more market-oriented and expenditures are rising.
The Commercialization of Politics and Party Dealignment The Costs of Campaigning
In the US, most campaign funding comes from private corporations and wealthy individuals, whereas in Western Europe, the parties themselves and the state provide most of the money. The commercialization of politics and the essential role of large-scale private funding in the US enables corporations to maintain a disproportionate hold on political discourse and practice, putting national politicians on a full-time money chase during their legislative lives and allowing corporate industry lobbyists and wealthy donors highly privileged access to politicians and to legislative and administrative policy (Sussman and Galizio 2003: 310) .
Likewise, in Indonesia, it seems to be easier now for wealthy businessmen to influence policymaking (Kleden 2009: 51ff.) .
The commodification of politics can amplify an already deep-rooted pattern of "money politics". It encompasses four different forms that contribute to the dealignment of parties and voters. First, the mobilization of voters -that is, campaigning -is marked by spiralling costs and the marketization of candidates and their policy offers. Second, candidates often have to pay political parties for their candidacies. Thus, internal party organization is commercialized. This commercialization is also strengthened by a third form of "money politics" -namely, the mobilization of delegates as voters at party congresses through campaigning and different forms of vote-buying. Fourth, policymaking by MPs and by directly elected mayors, district heads, governors, and presidents is, arguably, influenced by their own business interests or those of their financiers.
Whereas in Western countries party and campaign financing are curbed by strict laws, the lackadaisical observance of laws in Indonesia opens the door for misuse. Moreover, the introduction of pilkada has changed the forms of "money politics" (Kleden 2008: 32ff.) . Whereas before, MPs had the power to choose governors, district heads, and mayors (and to accept money in exchange), now many candidates have to pay huge amounts to the nominating political parties. And many of them have to finance their own campaigns, often without the help of the cash-strapped parties. A candidate for gubernatorial elections may spend up to 40 billion IDR. 22 Investigations by the newspaper Kompas show that a survey at this level costs anywhere from 100 million to 500 million IDR, and advertisements in different media cost from 1 billion to 5 billion IDR per month. 23 The financial position of the parties seems to be deteriorating. The The parties are now desperately searching for money because they have to shoulder the expenses for political marketing. 24 In 1999, they spent about 22 1 billion IDR is approximately 100,000 USD. 23 Kompas 2010c. Fashion designer Poppy Susanty Dharsono explains that she is forced to spend between 10 billion and 50 billion IDR to obtain the nomination for district head or the gubernatorial elections, respectively (Media Indonesia 2010a . 24 One way to do this is to gather a few hundred businesspeople and their representatives in a five-star hotel and to ask for briefcases with donations in USD (Jakarta Post 2009c).
10 million USD on advertising; in 2009 this amount increased to 117 million USD (Qodari 2010: 123) . 25 Between January and late March 2009 alone, the PD spent 5.1 million USD on television advertisements, followed by Golkar with 4.8 million USD, and Gerindra with 4.4 million USD. 26 The consequences of this commercialization are twofold: Parties are increasingly financed by a few conglomerates, and more MPs and politicians in general are businesspeople or proxies of them. In 2004, many more members of the national parliament were businesspeople (approximately 40 per cent) in comparison to the 1999 parliament (on Golkar see Tomsa 2008: 64ff.) . In 2010, the majorities of all party factions in the DPR were entrepreneurs or businessmen (Kompas 2010a) . The commercialization of campaigning is dangerous for democratic consolidation because of the weakening of party organizations and parties' grass roots. 27 At the local level, ordinary citizens are hardly able to actively influence local politics: "Both institutional and socio-economic factors have limited the pool of people who can run in elections to a small group of local elites" (Bühler 2010: 283) . Moreover, wealthy businessmen expect compensation for their investments. Business tycoons such as Soetrisno Bachir (former chairman of the PAN), Jusuf Kalla (the former Indonesian vice president), Surya Paloh and Aburizal Bakrie have risen through the ranks of political parties because of their money, and at least some of them use their positions to help their companies. 28 It is easily conceivable that such patterns are replicated below the national level. Moreover, some of the owners of the ten commercial television stations have a direct stake in party politics. The Bakrie Group, for example, owns Anteve and TVOne. Another prominent Golkar politician who is currently trying to build his own political party 25 "[...] is Surya Paloh, owner of Metro TV, who "has misused his position by allowing more broadcast time for his favourite political figures and issues during election periods" (Hollander, d'Haenens, and Bardoel 2009: 49) .
The Dealignment and Growing Market Orientation of Political Parties
This rapid commercialization is taking place at a time when political parties are increasingly affected by the dealignment of voters. In Europe, the transformation of parties was effected by new forms of campaigning mainly due to technological developments, and by socio-structural change -that is, the decline of religious and class linkages, the pluralization of milieus, and individualization. This dealignment is observable in Indonesia, too (Johnson Tan 2009 ). It is indicated first by parties that have poor platforms and/or are no longer as deeply rooted in social milieus as they once were (Ufen 2008) . Linkages between voters and parties are, according to surveys, mostly "emotional" and "most Indonesians are unaware of differences among the political parties" (Sukma 2009: 334) . Second, there is a tendency among political parties to form cartels (Slater 2004 Lees-Marshment (2001) this general dealignment can tentatively be described as the evolution from productoriented parties toward sales-and market-oriented parties. In Indonesia, one may cautiously differentiate between four kinds of political parties: those milieu-based parties with links to very old predecessors and/or mass organizations such as the PKB, the PAN, and the PDI-P; the former New Order regime party Golkar with widespread clientelist links; the very professional PKS with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood-inspired, half-clandestine, elitist tarbiyah (education) movement that has been based at Indonesian universities since the 1970s; and the newly found presidential vehicles such as the Partai Demokrat, Gerindra and Hanura.
None of these parties is, in contrast to many parties in the 1950s, predominantly product-or policy-oriented. An exception is the predecessor of the PKS, the PK, when in 1999 it propagated Islamist objectives. But since then, the PKS has shifted toward the centre of the political spectrum and increasingly combines a sales orientation with a market orientation (Fealy 2010) . Golkar also tends to adopt a more market-oriented stance.
Likewise, the three "vehicle parties" do not have elaborated platforms, are hardly based in distinct social milieus and/or ideological traditions, and are thus keen on adjusting their commitments according to the fluctuating demands of the voter market. The Partai Demokrat can, at least, "sell" its charismatic leader, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Only the PKB, the PAN and the PDI-P are, arguably, parties more willing to sell their product more independently from voter expectations and inclinations. This has been vividly illustrated by the aloofness and/or erratic behaviour of party leaders such as Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati who have never seemed to care much about the marketability of their public perception. 29 
Concluding Remarks
With reference to Indonesia, the three stages of campaigning are also identifiable. The first elections in 1955 were not unlike those of stage one described above. At that time, voters were mobilized along social cleavages; the organization of the campaign was decentralized with strong local branches; advertisement agencies, consultants, and opinion polling were not involved; and TV and radio were insignificant. Under the New Order regime, although TV and new media were slowly introduced, political restrictions stalled the transition toward stage two. The national elections in 1999 and 2004 were in many ways marked by stage-two features (especially TV-based campaigning), whereas pilkada (that is, local direct elections from 2005 onwards) and the legislative and presidential elections in 2009 evince some characteristics of stage three. The result is not a comprehensive "Americanization", but a hybridization of indigenous and foreign methods as a result of a country-specific party and media system, the political culture, electoral laws, and campaign regulations. Campaigning is still centred on TV, whereas narrow-casting through multiple channels is still atypical. But professional consultants who have become personalities in their own right use more sophisticated means and compete with party executives over the conduct of the campaign.
The general dealignment of political parties and the extraordinary rise of pollsters and consultants have effected escalating costs and a commerciallization of campaigning. The professionalization itself does not necessarily entail a dealignment and an erosion of party organization. Professionalization can also improve the internal organization, sharpen the programmatic profile of political parties, and contribute to voter education. Polls can be a 29 But Megawati is also improving her "marketability". On her surprising performance at the last party congress, see Aspinall 2010. means to feel the pulse of voters and to respond according to their demands. The professionalization becomes questionable when "spin doctors" deluge the public with contentless sound bites and artificial images and when personality and style take precedence over political platforms. When democracy is combined with a poorly restricted commercialization of not only the media sector but of politics in general, the stability of the democracy itself may be threatened. In sum, Indonesia's democratic deepening is currently being put at risk by the rise of increasingly market-oriented parties within an environment of mass media controlled by big capital and powerful business conglomerates with direct linkages to politics, along with the general dealignment of voters and parties. Yet so far, Indonesia's relatively well-institutionalized party system has stalled the development of huge business-firm parties such as those in Thailand (e.g. Thaksin's TRT) or in Italy (e.g. Berlusconi's Forza Italia).
